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Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menyelidiki motivasi Jepang untuk terlibat dalam sengketa Laut Cina Selatan. Dengan menggunakan metode 
penelitian kualitatif, penelitian ini menganalisis dokumen resmi Pemerintah Jepang dan literatur yang relevan untuk mencapai tujuan penelitian 
tersebut. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa kepentingan utama Jepang di Laut Cina Selatan adalah untuk mengimbangi ekspansi Tiongkok dan 
menciptakan jalur maritim yang lebih aman demi terwujudnya Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Menggunakan kerangka regional security complex, 
penelitian ini melihat bahwa Jepang, dengan kehadirannya di Laut Cina Selatan, mencoba untuk meningkatkan interaksi keamanan dengan 
negara-negara Asia Tenggara untuk memperluas sub kompleks regional Asia Timur Laut, yang bertujuan untuk memperkuat persepsi Cina 
sebagai ancaman terhadap negara-negara Asia Tenggara. Keterlibatan di Laut Cina Selatan akan memperkuat hubungan keamanan Jepang 
dengan negara-negara Asia Tenggara yang dapat menyeimbangkan sifat ekspansif Tiongkok di Laut Cina Selatan, mempercepat terwujudnya visi 
Free and Open Indo-Pacific yang diprakarsai oleh Tokyo.
Kata kunci: regional security complex, Laut Cina Selatan, Jepang, Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
Abstract
This research aims to investigate Japan’s motivation to be involved in the South China Sea dispute despite Japan’s far distance from the 
conflicted area. Utilizing the qualitative research method, this research analyzes Japanese Government official documents and relevant 
literature to achieve the research objective. The research discovers that Japan’s main interest in the South China Sea is to articulate a safer 
maritime lane for the sake of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific agenda by balancing China’s assertiveness in the region. Employing a regional 
security complex framework, this research sees that Japan, by its presence in the South China Sea, tries to intensify the security interaction with 
Southeast Asian counterparts to expand the Northeast Asian regional subcomplex, aiming to strengthen the perception of China as a threat to 
Southeast Asian countries. The South China Sea involvement will fortify Japan’s security interlink with Southeast Asian counterparts, balancing 
China’s expansive trait in the maritime zone, accelerating Tokyo-initiated Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. 
Keywords: regional security complex, South China Sea, Japan, Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
INTRODUCTION
      It is widely known that South China Sea is not part 
of Japanese territory, but only a few can grasp the fact 
that Japan is, to some significant extent, involved in the 
South China Sea maritime dispute (Drifte, 2016). Since 
Japan is neither a claimant nor directly threatened by 
China’s nine-dash line in the South China Sea, what 
Japan looks for by involving itself in such a complicated 
dispute is interesting. Despite the anomaly, it can be 
seen that by Japan’s participation in achieving South 
China Sea stability, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is 
aiming for a stronger Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
(FOIP) strategy by balancing China’s assertiveness in 
the South China Sea.
       The South China Sea, due to its high economic and 
geopolitical value, has been one of the most vital 
maritime zones around the world. Its strategic location 
as a major world shipping lane and abundant natural 
resources beneath the sea generated trade shipping 
activities valued at about $5.3 billion, almost one-third 
of world maritime trade (Saiidi, 2018). Moreover, the 
sea has vast amount of natural resources and is a central 
sea lane for global shipment. Since the sea lane is highly 
strategic, it is also prone to over-lapping border claims, 
leading to regional instability. Since the 1970s, tension 
has been escalating due to China’s nine-dash line claim 
over the South China Sea, which violates many 
Southeast Asian nations’ sea sovereignty, such as the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia. China, 
aiming to fortify its presence in the South China Sea, 
has built artificial military islands around Paracel and 
Spratlys Island, fully equipped with port facilities, 
navigating sensor arrays, runways, and bunkers for 
weapons (Stashwick, 2019). In response, the other 
claimant states have also deployed many military 
maneuvers to assert their border stance in the South 
China Sea, causing anxiety for many.
     Outside major power, such as the United States, is 
also concerned about the stability within the region by 
arraying many militaries and naval operations in the 
maritime domain, such as Freedom of Navigation 
Operation (FONOP) in 2018 (LaGrone, 2018). Japan, 
as the United States’ closest ally in Asia, is into the 
same narrative. Since Shinzo Abe’s second term in 
2012, Japan has established many security frameworks 
with Southeast Asian allies, especially under the 
ASEAN framework, as Storey (2013) stated. Those 
include, but are not limited to, defense equipment 
transfers, joint military training and human capacity 
building as the ASEAN Chairman stated during Manila 
ASEAN-Japan Summit in 2017: 
      This research aims to investigate Japan’s motivation 
to be involved in the South China Sea dispute by 
employing naval military activities and arranging 
security cooperation with Southeast Asians despite 
Japan’s far distance from the conflicted area. Utilizing 
the qualitative research method, this research analyzes 
Japanese Government official documents, ASEAN 
communique and relevant literature to achieve the 
research objective. This paper argues that Japan’s 
interest in the South China Sea is to accelerate regional 
peace and maritime stability as one main part of the 
Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) agenda. Employing 
a regional security complex framework, this paper 
explains that Japan, by its presence in the South China 
Sea, tries to intensify the security interaction with 
Southeast Asian counterparts to expand the Northeast 
Asian regional subcomplex, aiming to strengthen the 
perception of China as a threat to Southeast Asian 
countries. 
“ASEAN noted Japan’s constructive contributions 
to the development and regional cooperation, 
including through its “Free and Open Indo- Pacific 
strategy”. We noted the importance of enhancing 
cooperation among maritime law enforcement 
agencies, such as capacity building assistance, joint 
exercises, information sharing, including Maritime 
Domain Awareness.” (Duterte, 2017).
LITERATURE REVIEW
  The current literatures are mainly discussing the 
motivations of Japan and the method it employed to be 
involved in the South China Sea. The first group’s main 
analysis is Japan’s economic interest in the South China 
Sea as most of Japan’s energy import and trade goes 
through the maritime lane. The other group mainly 
researches the potential actions Japan can take to delve 
into the dispute and draws policy suggestions for Japan in 
tackling possible domestic and international challenges. 
    Storey (2013) and Shoji (2014) both explained that 
Japan’s main concern in the South China Sea is to 
contain China’s assertiveness and encourage peaceful 
settlement. Storey (2013) found that Japan’s interests in 
achieving stability in the South China Sea protect its 
trade flow in Southeast Asia and prevent China from 
weakening Asian nations’ legal norms. Shoji (2014) then 
elaborated that Japan utilizes existing multilateral 
frameworks, especially with ASEAN, to inject maritime 
security issues to raise the awareness of the rule of law 
enforcement in the South China Sea. Two years later, 
Drifte (2016) discovered that Japan’s decision to delve 
into the South China Sea is due to its connectivity with 
the East China Sea, where it directly clashes over 
Senkaku/Diayou Islands with China. The research also 
revealed that Japan was pushed to be more active in the 
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South China Sea since Asian nations were anxious 
whether the United States was committed enough to 
balance China in the region.
      While in a practical sense, Midford (2015) highlighted 
Japan’s multilateralism and Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) utilization as the policy tool in forming 
South China Sea stability. Those ODAs were given to 
littoral states around the South China Sea, such as 
Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam, to fortify the 
security of the vital maritime lanes, such as Lombok and 
Malacca Strait. The research also predicted that Japan 
would play a minimalist role in the dispute. In a more 
optimistic nuance, Koga (2018) said that Japan’s South 
China Sea policy of capacity building and diplomatic 
enhancements has raised the confidence of Southeast 
Asian countries against China’s pressure.
     This article sees the bigger picture that East Asia and 
Southeast Asia have been more connected than before in 
terms of security issues since countries from both regions 
have gradually shared similar concerns and anxiety. By 
default, geographically East and the South China Sea are 
two directly connected parts forming the China Sea, 
making those the main gate for shipping lane distributing 
goods and energy supplies to Northeast Asian ports in 
Japan, China and South Korea (LaFond, 2017). 
Consequentially, the increasing connectivity of growing 
Southeast Asia and East Asia relies on the security of 
these seas. Therefore, many related actors are treating the 
South and the East China Sea issues in tandems as a 
connected whole, such as Japan that fortifies maritime 
security cooperation with ASEAN member states and the 
United States that particularly passed “The South China 
Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act” to counter 
China’s assertiveness (Shoji, 2014; Ghosh, 2019). 
However, the analysis of how these interlinks emerged is 
lacking. Using the regional security complex theory, this 
article aims to close the gap by elaborating on how Japan’s 
South China Sea policy intensified the link of Northeast 
Asia security complex and Asia security subcomplex in 
Southeast Asia. 
Maintenance of status quo. As the name says, the 
three major components are persisted to maintain 
their initial form. Despite the least tangible 
change, it does not mean that there was no 
change. The change did occur but least impactful 
to the structure.
Internal transformation. It can be inferred that there 
is an internal change within the border of the 
local complex.   
External transformation. Such transformation 
occurs when there is an expansion or a 
contraction of its existing outer boundary. It 
might include new states or exclude the existing 
states from the current complex.
Overlay. It means that there are one or more 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
      This research employed the regional security complex 
theory initiated by Barry Buzan to answer the research 
question. There is a fundamental and expanded 
definition of what a security complex is. Initially, a 
security complex was defined as “a set of states whose major 
security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their 
national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or 
resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 
1998). This definition was then expanded to be “a set of 
units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or 
both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot 
reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” 
(Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998). From those definitions, 
it can be seen that the main spirit of a security complex is 
the common and contingent security issues among the 
states within the complex. Therefore, this theory also 
argues that security is socially constructed, and there must 
be a securitizing actor initiating the definition of certain 
critical and threatening conditions that requires prompt 
responses (Buzan, 2003).  
     To form a security complex, three main components 
are required: (1) the structure of the units; (2) the amity 
and enmity formation; and (3) the power distribution 
among the major units (Buzan, 2003). These metrics can 
be used to analyze whether some changes occur within 
the regional security complex. Buzan (2003) elaborated 
four ways to evaluate the regional security complex shift: 
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external power(s) moving into the regional 
complex causing a drastic shift within the 
boundary. 
Figure 1. Asian Security Supercomplex Pattern 
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003)
      Referring to Figure 1, the theory was utilized to frame 
Japan’s security policy to the South China Sea as an 
external transformation of Northeast Asia regional 
subcomplex by expanding its southern boundary beyond 
the East China Sea to the South China Sea. The metrics 
of essential components then evaluated whether Japan 
has created some changes in the security complex. The 
structure explained in this paper comprises South China 
Sea claimants (Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei and 
Malaysia), China, and outside powers (Japan and the 
United States). 
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC:
SIGNIFICANCE FOR JAPAN
      This research sees that the grand interest of Japan in 
its South China Sea policy is to accelerate the realization 
of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. FOIP, 
as its name states, is an idea where sustainable prosperity 
can be achieved by linking two continents (Asia-Africa) 
and two oceans (Indo-Pacific), with ASEAN as the bridge 
connecting the two as it is geopolitically positioned in 
between (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). 
Introduced by Shinzo Abe in 2016 during Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD) in Nairobi, Kenya, on August 27th, 2016, this 
strategy is seen to be significant in expanding the 
economic zone stimulating free trade and investment 
(Aizawa, 2018). Shinzo Abe (2016) also stated in his 
speech:
       The success of this agenda is significant for Japan since 
its economic growth is mainly reliant on access to foreign 
markets and supplies through Asia, the Middle East and 
“Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the 
confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of 
Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, 
the rule of law, and the market economy, free from 
force or coercion and making it prosperous.” 
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RESEARCH METHOD
  As highlighted earlier, this research seeks to 
understand Japan’s foreign policy decision to engage the 
South China Sea dispute. To achieve the objective, the 
research was done using qualitative method with 
disciplined configurative case studies approach. The 
mentioned approach of case studies aims to explain a 
certain event or phenomena using an established theory 
(George & Bennett, 2005). In answering the research 
question, this article presented official documents from 
related governments, reliable literatures, and press 
statements by relevant stakeholders. The amassed data 
then analyzed using an established theory, which is 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). The 
specified detail about the theory is mentioned in the 
following subsection.
JAPAN INTENSIFIED SOUTHEAST ASIA
SECURITY ENGAGEMENT:
SUBCOMPLEX EXPANSION
      Examined with regional security complex theory, this 
paper argues that Japan tries to expand the Northeast 
Asia subcomplex southward, creating external expansion. 
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, it requires 
three major elements to form a security complex; (1) the 
structure of the units; (2) the amity and enmity 
formation; and (3) the power distribution among the 
major units (Buzan, 2003).
   First, it fulfills the requirement of unit structures 
forming a system similar to the global one; Southeast Asia 
is anarchical. There is no governing rule in the South 
China Sea that can guarantee any country to comply with 
rules, not even international law, as China is not opting 
to obey it to begin with. To create a balance of power, 
many outside powers, such as the United States and 
Japan, have been present in Southeast Asia for that 
purpose. In addition, Japan and China have been 
integrating into Southeast Asia’s regional structure since 
both are in a tight rivalry in investment, economy, politics 
and security. Buzan & Wæver (2003) referred to Waltz’s 
1979 work to define the idea of structure. By this 
Waltzian view, the structure is defined as how the units 
are arranged and placed within a system. In international 
politics, the units forming the structure are states. 
Contextualized with this specific South China Sea case, 
the units are states involved in the dispute, and those are 
Southeast Asian states, Japan, China and the United 
States. ASEAN is indeed an inseparable entity from the 
discourse. However, the primary gravity is more on how 
the Association’s actions serve the member states’ interest 
rather than on how ASEAN works as an international 
organization deciding for itself. Therefore, ASEAN is still 
part of the discourse, but the units are still the member 
states. 
Africa nexus (Brown, 2018). Not to mention that Japan is 
also struggling to revitalize itself economically; thus, the 
uninterrupted progress of this geo-economic agenda has 
become even more important for Japan. Other than that, 
Japan’s energy supply is 80% imported, making the safety 
of maritime interconnectivity vital for Japan’s survival 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004). Therefore, 
intercontinental connectivity is essential for Japan, even 
without the FOIP agenda.  
  However, FOIP vision will be restrained from 
becoming truly lucrative if Southeast Asia, as the vital 
post, is unstable. The stability in Southeast Asian 
maritime ground, namely the South China Sea, is vital 
since it is the main export-and-import shipping lane and 
energy supplies in that region that many states are relying 
upon. In addition to the reliance of many major 
economies such as Japan and South Korea on the South 
China Sea for trade, the maritime domain is also crucial 
for Southeast Asians as it employs 3.7 million people 
producing 12% of world fishery supplies (Mastro, 2020). 
On the other hand, the stability required to achieve FOIP 
is challenged by China’s assertiveness, leading many 
surrounding states to feel insecure (Szechenyi & Hosoya, 
2018). The nine-dash line claimed by China has escalated 
the military activities in the South China Sea, prone to 
maritime confrontation among the conflicting states. 
Despite China being ambiguous and somewhat reluctant 
to assert the legal argument of the nine-dash line, China 
has bold military measures in defending it. China has two 
goals in the South China Sea, which are to “maintain the 
stability” and “protecting their rights” in the maritime 
domain (Zhang, 2017). China has conducted a series of 
military activities in the disputed area, such as naval drills 
and training on an “unusually large scale” with carrier 
ships in 2018 (Pearson & Torode, 2018). Not only that 
China flexes its military power, it also projects 
administrative bargaining by establishing artificial 
military islands around the Spratly Islands in the South 
China Sea (Mangosing, 2018). Such measures taken by 
China caused growing insecurities among Southeast 
Asian countries as it breached their maritime sovereignty 
and caused many naval standoffs within the troubled 
waters (Pearson, 2020). The volatile shipping lane may 
discourage trade activities through Southeast Asia, 
jeopardizing the benefit targeted by the FOIP agenda in 
expanding the lucrative economic sphere in the 
Indo-Pacific. Therefore, containing China is one major 
FOIP mission concerning stability.
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       Second, Japan and Southeast Asian nations, represented 
by ASEAN, have agreed that the unilateral actions by 
China are a threat against the regional stability. Vietnam, 
which is the 2020 Chair of ASEAN representing the 
10-members bloc, during the 36th ASEAN Summit, 
delivered the Association’s stance to stick with the 1982 
United Nations Oceans Treaty in an opposing manner to 
China’s claim (The Guardian, 2020). Therefore, Southeast 
Asian nations viewed Japan’s security involvement in the 
region as a contributive one (Duterte, 2017). In a security 
context, under Abe Doctrine, Japan has been pursuing 
security cooperation with Southeast Asian counterparts 
to balance China, in which favorable response was given 
in return to Japan’s security initiatives (Nguyen, 2016). 
Under the Shinzo Abe administration, Japan has 
deployed its first defense initiative to Southeast Asia, 
termed Vientiane Vision, to fortify Japan’s regional 
security role in the region (Parameswaran, 2019). Under 
this initiative, Japan and Southeast Asian counterparts 
have carried out many agendas such as joint exercises, 
human development programs and defense industry 
cooperation. In this sense, Japan’s security engagement 
has created an amity and enmity formation. United 
Nations Oceans Treaty in an opposing manner to China’s 
claim (The Guardian, 2020). Therefore, Southeast Asian 
nations viewed Japan’s security involvement in the region 
as a contributive one (Duterte, 2017). In a security 
context, under Abe Doctrine, Japan has been pursuing 
security cooperation with Southeast Asian counterparts 
to balance China, in which favorable response was given 
in return to Japan’s security initiatives (Nguyen, 2016). 
Under the Shinzo Abe administration, Japan has 
deployed its first defense initiative to Southeast Asia, 
termed Vientiane Vision, to fortify Japan’s regional 
security role in the region (Parameswaran, 2019). Under 
this initiative, Japan and Southeast Asian counterparts 
have carried out many agendas such as joint exercises, 
human development programs and defense industry 
cooperation. In this sense, Japan’s security engagement 
has created an amity and enmity formation. 
      Third, penetration of Japan, along with its closest ally, 
the United States, to the South China Sea conflict does 
change the power distribution in Southeast Asia, 
balancing the rise of China in the region. Both Japan and 
the United States are similarly concerned about China’s 
expansionism in the region, both in the East and the 
South China Sea, thus aiming to contain it (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). Japan’s actions in the 
South China Sea have redistributed the power within the 
structure as it improved other units’ military capabilities. 
In this sense, the Regional Complex Security Theory 
mixes the neorealist and constructivist approaches to 
analyze power distribution (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). In 
the constructivist lens, the distribution is defined as how 
the enmity and amity are constructed, in tandem and as 
the first point explained. In the neorealist perspective, the 
power is distributed structurally by material powers that 
the units have. This third part elaborates on the 
neorealist part of the power distribution, in particular, in 
the military context.
      The first signal of Japan’s interest in being involved in 
the South China Sea emerged as Japan initiated many 
security cooperation with Southeast Asian nations, 
especially the claimants aiming to strengthen alliances for 
balancing China in the South China Sea, as Nguyen 
(2016) explained. Japan has weaponized its Southeast 
Asian counterparts by donating aircraft and vessels as 
maritime defense equipment in the South China Sea. 
Since Japan lifted its military export ban in 2014, it 
donated six patrol boats to Vietnam (Hiep, 2017), five 
units of patrol aircraft to the Philippines (Parameswaran, 
2017), and would lease other units of vessels to Indonesia 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of 
Indonesia, 2020). It was mentioned that Japan had its 
first defense initiative to ASEAN called Vientiane Vision, 
aiming to strengthen maritime ties with and fortify the 
capacity of ASEAN nations. Furthermore, Japan has also 
conducted military exercises in Malacca Strait with the 
United States to fortify its Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
vision as Malacca Strait is the chokepoint between the 
Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean (Panda, 2019). In 
addition to providing weaponries and holding exercises, 
Japan has built maritime infrastructures to maintain 
security, such as establishing radar stations in the Sulu 
Celebes Islands to prevent piracy (Kelly & Kubo, 2017). 
Japan’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute is a 
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strategic move to fortify its alliance with Southeast Asian 
nations as political capital to balance China in the South 
China Sea. Japan’s maneuver to collaborate with ASEAN 
in balancing China can be explained as ASEAN strategic 
importance has been escalating for Japan in recent years, 
as Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated in his speech 
during an official visit to Southeast Asia in 2013:     
 
       ASEAN geopolitical value as the native of South China 
Sea territory is an essential metric on how ASEAN 
importance advances among conflicting parties. Therefore, 
strengthening the tactical alignment with ASEAN, the 
host regional organization in Southeast Asia, will be 
significant to minimize Beijing’s expansion in the South 
China Sea.  
    Along with the geographical consideration, Japan’s 
engagement with Southeast Asian nations is also caused 
by the fact that China similarly threatens many maritime 
grounds, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and 
Brunei Darussalam. It gives an urgent reason for Japan 
and those Southeast Asian claimants (along with ASEAN 
as its regional organization) to cooperate as their political 
interests are now related. Despite being an outsider of the 
South China Sea, Japan also fights for its survival against 
China in the Senkaku/Diayou battle in the East China 
Sea. This crisis has engaged Southeast Asia and ASEAN 
to strengthen maritime Asia, vital to the Japanese 
diplomatic agenda under Shinzo Abe’s administration 
(Pajon, 2013).  Intensifying the alliance with ASEAN is a 
step toward balancing China in championing the FOIP 
agenda.
  Having a stronger tie with Southeast Asian 
counterparts is undoubtedly not enough to achieve the 
Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. Therefore, Japan’s 
presence in the dispute also aims to fortify the United 
States primacy in the South China Sea, according to 
Sato’s 2018 study. As one of the closest allies in Asia, the 
United States encourages Japan to intensify its 
participation in maintaining the peace and stability in 
the region since Japan’s presence will contribute to more 
stability in the region, as Kelly & Kubo stated in 2015. It 
is in line with Shinzo Abe’s New Five Principles 
introduced in 2013, aiming to foster cooperation to 
maintain the maritime security in the region with 
ASEAN, reaffirming its favor to the United States, thus 
rebalancing the Asia-Pacific agenda (Abe, 2013). By 
Japan’s stronger presence in the South China Sea, both 
direct and indirect, it is expected to strengthen the 
long-lasting Japan-United States security alliance as the 
main spearhead to contain China’s assertiveness in the 
South China Sea, expecting to bring more stability. 
       Japan and the United States have a lot of similar and 
intersecting strategic interests in a general context. Tokyo 
and Washington are actually within the same boat 
concerning the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. 
Beyond the bilateral alliance, Japan and the United States 
are two of four countries calling themselves “the Quad”. 
The Quad is a name given for Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
agenda pioneering countries consisting of Japan, United 
States, India and Australia.
    After ten years of hiatus since Shinzo Abe’s initial 
proposal in 2007, all of the Quad states were committed 
to revive the security dialogue during ASEAN Summit 
Manila 2017 and motivated to contain the ambition of 
China to dominate Asia through its Belt and Road 
Initiative Program and expansive behavior in South 
China Sea (Howell, 2018). Since Japan and the United 
States, along with the other Quad members, are major 
maritime powers with high reliance on the Indian and 
Pacific Ocean, the strategic partnership will be likely to 
progressively grow. By default, Indo-Pacific is the 
economically prospective region where the world’s three 
largest economies (United States, China and Japan) are 
located, making it possible to be the new center of the 
world economic hub. It is the huge economic sphere they 
are fighting for, as the United States stated the maritime 
domain as “the single most consequential region for 
America’s future” (The Department of Defense of United 
States of America, 2019). The Quad member states are 
“I will push forward with strategic diplomacy that 
contributes to both Japan’s national interests and 
the peace and prosperity of the region and the 
world. ASEAN is an important partner in fostering 
the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific 
region, and Japan will place importance on ASEAN 
going forward in terms of both economic growth 
and security.”  
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also expressing their strong interest in cooperating in 
developing their infrastructure projects before China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative takes full domination (He & 
Mingjang, 2020).  This type of tight bond clarifies the 
similar interest Japan and United States share, both in 
containing China in the South China Sea and achieving 
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. In addition, the United 
States’ Department of Defense also stated that the Free 
and Open Indo-Pacific under the Trump administration 
will be executed by strengthening the strategic 
cooperation with key allies in Asia, such as Japan 
(Silverberg & Sullivan, 2019). Thus, a solidified presence 
in the South China Sea will help Tokyo maintain 
Washington’s presence in the region as deterrence 
against China.
  The main metric of a security complex is the 
interlinked security concerns. Japan has been 
intensifying its security engagement in Southeast Asia, 
especially since Shinzo Abe assumed office in 2012. The 
dispute in the South China Sea has given the 
conservative Shinzo Abe a stronger justification to 
employ militaristic domestic and foreign policies, 
especially to Southeast Asia. For decades, Japan’s 
approach to Southeast Asia has been gravitated around 
an economic approach, both in transactional activities 
such as investment and trade as well as in official 
development assistance. Fukuda Doctrine, introduced 
by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in 1977, aims to 
convince Southeast Asia that Japan is an “equal partner” 
that aims to build a “heart-to-heart” relationship and to 
“exclude military element” in their relationship (Er, 
2013). However, a major shift in foreign policy occurred 
following Shinzo Abe’s introduction of his new 
security-oriented grand strategy, famously known as Abe’s 
Doctrine. Boldly different from Fukuda Doctrine, this 
Doctrine is driven by the ambition to be more proactive 
in international security, especially by the closer ties with 
Southeast Asian counterparts as a containment strategy 
against China (Fukuda, 2015). Introduced to the ASEAN 
audience in 2013, Shinzo Abe openly expressed its 
motivation to fortify maritime security in Asia and 
support the United States presence in the region (Abe, 
2013). As a result, the security issues around Southeast 
 and Northeast Asia have been more interlinked due to 
Japan’s initiatives, especially concerning the South China 
Sea.
     As RSCT emphasizes on neorealist view on structure, 
Japan’s actions to stretch its military muscles further to 
Southeast Asia are a reaction toward structural necessity.  
As Japan’s closest ally in the structure, United States, is 
declining, it needs to equip itself with more flexibility to 
engage with other countries in security aspects to cover up 
the missing power in Southeast Asia (Sakaki, 2015). In a 
more specific Southeast Asia context, Arase (2019) 
explained that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 
increasing naval presence in the region threaten Japan’s 
interest. However, Japan cannot act freely due to 
domestic and international constraints, and it needs to 
cooperate with other countries to create collective actions 
in countering China’s revisionist agenda.
   Beyond establishing stronger security cooperation, 
Japan’s maneuver in the South China Sea also includes 
the securitization of China as a threat to regional stability, 
which is the major element of a security complex. Besides 
numerous statements in the Japanese Defense White 
Book and Diplomatic Blue Book, Shinzo Abe also 
warned that China might make the South China Sea 
“Lake of Beijing”, framing China’s flex in the maritime 
domain ominous (Holmes, 2013). Japan might not be the 
sole and direct reason other Southeast Asian countries 
see China’s unilateral actions in the South China Sea as 
a threat, but the issue of the South China Sea has always 
been in the high-summits where Japan and Southeast 
Asian countries are in, such as ASEAN Regional Forum. 
In response, as mentioned earlier, not just Southeast 
Asian countries adopted many policies to protects their 
seas from China. Those countries also cooperate with 
Japan in doing so.
   Japan’s main motivation to intensively engage with 
Southeast Asia has been to protect its Free and 
Open-Indo Pacific agenda.  This article supports the 
argument by presenting the idea that Japan’s South China 
Sea policy has expanded Northeast Asia security 
subcomplex southward by securitizing China among 
Southeast Asian audiences. It will be easier for Japan to 
stabilize Southeast Asia linchpin connecting the Indian 
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“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific involves the further 
strengthening and optimization of ASEAN-led 
mechanisms, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense 
Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), the Expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) and others such as the 
relevant ASEAN Plus One mechanisms.” (ASEAN, 2019).  
Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. ASEAN, initiated by 
Indonesia, then drafted “ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific” 
to catch up with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific by 
establishing the ASEAN version of the Indo-Pacific strategy 
(Saha, 2019). Even though the Outlook, when it was 
published in 2019, was still seen to be premature, it showed 
that ASEAN was urged to express its motivation not to be left 
out in the rapid Indo-Pacific conversation (Parameswaran, 
2019). Within the Outlook official release, ASEAN showed 
its concern to the maritime awareness in the region and its 
commitment to use the existing multilateral framework such 
as East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum to address 
strategic issues. Despite the fact that ASEAN Outlook on 
Indo-Pacific is multidimensional, this multilateral aspect of 
the Outlook is dominated by maritime and security 
frameworks as mentioned below: CONCLUSION
     This paper sees a similar concern that Japan still tries 
to securitize the South China Sea issue to the Southeast 
Asian audience to maintain support against China in the 
South China Sea. In evidence, Japan shows its enthusiasm 
and support to this Outlook, as Foreign Minister Motegi 
stated during his visit to ASEAN in early 2020:
“Why does Japan support the AOIP? It is primarily 
because the future image of the Indo-Pacific indicated 
in the AOIP has much in common with what Japan 
envisions as the future of the Indo-Pacific. The 
Indo-Pacific is the core of global dynamism, inhabited 
by half of the world’s population. At the same time, 
the balance of power is now rapidly changing there, 
with various actors interacting with one another in an 
intertwined manner.” (Motegi, 2020). 
     The foreign minister’s statement also emphasized to 
the ASEAN audience that there is an urgency to maintain 
the balance of power in the region, which can be 
interpreted as balancing China, as it is the only party with 
unilateral actions. This assertion is also supported by the 
following statement of Foreign Minister Motegi: 
      The follow-up statement confirms that the balance of 
power that Japan implies that the focus of Indo-Pacific 
includes the South China Sea dispute since it is the most 
problematic sea waters in Southeast Asia. 
“Particularly, in the waters of this region, which are 
public goods for the entire international community, all 
states must act, and their rights must be entitled in 
accordance with the basic principles of the international 
law of the sea, like freedom of navigation and all 
disputes regarding the seas must be settled peacefully. It 
is only by meeting these preconditions that this region 
can enjoy genuine prosperity as the hub of the sea 
lanes.” (Motegi, 2020). 
       As expressed, Japan’s engagement in the South China 
Sea dispute aims to accelerate a grand vision in 
maximizing Free and Open Indo-Pacific advancement for 
regional peace and maritime stability. As FOIP’s leading 
spirit is inter-continental connectivity, this agenda is 
essential for Japan’s wellbeing due to its high reliance on 
business with foreign partners across the world. Utilizing 
regional security complex theory, this research recognizes 
Japan’s maneuver in the South China Sea as part of 
external transformation expanding Northeast Asia 
subcomplex southward to Southeast Asia subcomplex, 
aiming to strengthen China securitization in Southeast 
Asia. Japan’s policy to be present in the South China Sea 
dispute fortified its alliance with Southeast Asian nations 
as the native of the region. Strengthening bonds with 
Southeast Asia and ASEAN will help Japan securitize and 
balance China as a step for FOIP realization. Japan’s 
South China Sea policies also deepen its alliance with the 
United States, as both states are united within “The 
Quad” alliance as FOIP initiators. As the Japan-United 
States alliance can work as a deterrent against China, 
fostering relations with Washington will help Tokyo 
contain Beijing’s expansion in maritime Asia. As a result, 
ASEAN then established its Outlook on Indo-Pacific, 
which is very coherent with Japan’s agenda in Southeast 
Asia on creating maritime stability, especially in the 
South China Sea. 
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